By Patrick Colbeck
On 26 April 2021, the MI AG attempted to dismiss the Antrim County Election Lawsuit filed by Attorney Matt DePerno on behalf of Antrim County resident Bill Bailey. The reason they gave for their motion? In a nutshell, they asserted that the testimony of University of Michigan Professor J. Alex Halderman discredits the testimony of the ASOG Group.
Does it? Let’s take a closer look.
Here’s a sample of the press releases related to the release of the report by Professor Halderman.
- Expert Report Affirms Accuracy of Antrim County Presidential Election Results (MI SoS)
- Michigan Expert Debunks Infamous Report on Antrim County (Detroit News)
- Professor Releases Definitive Antrim County Report (Channels 9 and 10 News)
Contrary to what the media and MI SoS would have you believe, there have been multiple expert testimonies from technical experts pertinent to the topic of the Antrim County electronic voting system.
The following list of technical expert testimonials will be evaluated in this analysis:
- 13 December 2020 ASOG Antrim Michigan Forensics Report [Redacted]
- 26 March 2021 Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident by J. Alex Halderman
- 8 April 2021 Antrim County, MI Election Management System Application Security Analysis by Cyber Ninjas
- 9 April 2021 Preliminary Assessment of Wireless Communications Technology for Michigan Voting Systems by James T. Penrose
- 8 April 2021 Affidavit of Benjamin R. Cotton
Now, let’s look at the point-by-point assertions made in the ASOG Group report not simply through the lens of the Halderman report but also from the perspective of additional technical experts who had access to the Antrim County data. When the review is complete, see for yourself whether the press releases above are best classified as truthful or propaganda.
| ID | Observation | ASOG | Halderman | Cyber Ninjas | Penrose | Cotton |
| 1 | High Antrim County error rate [8] | 68.05% error rate (10,667 of 15,676 events) AFTER re-provisioned CF card installed on November 6 | Some errors did occur, but they affected only specific contests in a small number of precincts. | Without ballot images it is near impossible to match up and see the origin of where errors might be happening. | No mention | No mention |
| 2 | High Central Lake Township error rate [10] | 81.96% error rate (1,222 ballots reversed out of 1,491 total) | Does not refute high error rate only interpretation of significance of high error rate. | Without ballot images it is near impossible to match up and see the origin of where errors might be happening. | No mention | No mention |
| 3 | Adjudication audit trail vulnerability [11] | Adjudication files can be moved between different Results Tally and Reporting terminals with no audit trail | Not addressed | Without ballot images it is difficult to audit how software interpreted a given ballot. | No mention | No mention |
| 4 | Failure to update system [14] | Basic security updates were not made. Compliance with federal standards doubtful. | “The report is correct that the EMS is missing important Windows security updates, potentially leaving it vulnerable to various methods of attack” [5.7] | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 5 | Adjudication logs missing [15] | “system shows vote adjudication logs for prior years; but all adjudication log entries for the 2020 election cycle are missing” | Adjudication logs were missing because voting system adjudication feature was not active in 2020 election cycle | Log levels are such on the system that it would be possible to delete files, delete logs, or the similar; and it would be difficult to have the necessary details available to investigate the incident. | No mention | No mention |
| 6 | Server security logs deleted [16] | Server security logs prior to 11:03pm on November 4,2020 are missing leaving no audit trail for election results. | “The report is correct that the Windows security event log in the EMS image only contains entries extending back to November 4, 2020, the day after the election (¶B.16). However, the timing appears to be a coincidence.” [5.7] | System Administrator utilized for all access. Regardless of what level of access a user has within the EMS application, they’d be able to change anything they wanted. | No mention | No mention |
| 7 | Post-Election Tampering with voting system data. [17] (NOTE: Later identified as Antrim County election officials operating under direction of Antrim County Clerk) | Election Event Design Log shows two election projects (10/23/2020 and 11/5/2020). Cited as violation of Help America Vote Act due to violation of 90-day Safe Harbor Period prohibiting changes to election systems, registries, hardware/software updates without re-certification of configuration. | Confirms existence of 2 election projects but takes issue with reference to 11/5/2020 instance as a “software update”. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 8 | Certification evidence [18] | No evidence of compliance with certification requirements | Asserts that observed configuration was compliant with EAC certification however fails to note discrepancy due to SQL Management Studio installation. | Presence of SQL Server Management Studio installation is not consistent with EAC certified configuration. | No mention | No mention |
| 9 | Clear evidence of software generated movement of votes [19] | Central Lake Township tabulator tape totals were significantly altered between 10/23/2020 and 11/05/2020 program versions. | Vote tally changes can be explained by examination of how software manages the reference ID’s in the ChoiceManifestation table. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 10 | Capable of connecting voting machines to internet [20] | ICP machines designed to connect to internet. File deletions impede further study. | “The report is correct that Dominion scanners have the ability to be connected to external networks (¶B.20). Some Michigan jurisdictions use this functionality to transmit preliminary results to their EMSes using wireless modems. Connecting scanners or EMSes to the Internet or other external networks creates signi ficant risks.” | No mention | Dominion provided quote for 17 ICP External Wireless Modems and 5 ImageCast Listener USB Modems. Dominion ICX system was in communications with computers in Taiwan and Germany. | Confirmed |
| 11 | Bulk adjudication of ballots [21] | No oversight, no transparency, no audit trails for rejected ballots. High error rates lead to conclusion that bulk adjudication must have occurred. | Digital adjudication workstations were not active in Antrim County, but adjudication by election officials via “spoil and duplicate” method was not addressed. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 12 | 2020 election results are not certifiable | Significant errors that exceed 1 in 250,000 error rate specified by EAC | Asserts 68% figure is meaningless since scanning a single ballot can result in dozens of lines in a log file. | Presence of non-certified software provides grounds for decertification. | No mention | No mention |
| 13 | Non-Compliance with Presidential Executive Orders [23] | Recommendation that an independent group be empaneled to determine the extent of the adjudication errors throughout State of Michigan. | No mention. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 14 | Same tactics deployed in Venezuelan elections deployed in Antrim County [24] | Smartmatic software used in Venezuela has been incorporated in Dominion Voting Systems. | “Venezuela using completely different voting technology than Michigan” | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 15 | Central Lake Vote Tally Changes [D] | we estimate 1,474 votes changed across the two rolls, between the first and the second time the exact same ballots were run through the County Clerk’s vote counting machine – which is almost the same number of voters that voted in total. | 1,474 vote change assertion not specifically addressed but an analysis of how ballot changes impacted vote tallies was provided | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 16 | Public accuracy test not ran for updated CF Card configurations in Central Lake [D.17] | Once the software was updated to the 10/22/2020 software the test ballots should have been re-run to validate the vote totals to confirm the machine was configured correctly. | “Although the Central Lake scanner was tested before election day, it was not tested again after the card was reinitialized with the revised election de finition prior to the November 6 re-scan.” [4.1] | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 17 | Software Version [D.20] | Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5.3-002 | Democracy Suite 5.5 | Not specified although Democracy Suite v5.5 certification referenced. | No mention | No mention |
| 18 | Ballot Design and Configuration [D.22] | Performed by Election Source of Grand Rapids, MI | Confirmed | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 19 | Public accuracy test not ran for updated CF Card configurations in Mancelona Township [E.1] | Mancelona elections officials understood that ballot processing issued were not accurate and used the second version of software to process votes on 4 November, again an election de-certifying event | “Although L&A testing cannot protect against sophisticated attacks on voting equipment [10], it should prevent both accidental and deliberate scanner con figuration errors.” “both Mancelona Township cards were tested after the cards were updated with the revised election defi nition” [4.1] | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 20 | Negligent security practices [I.1-10] | Hard drive not encrypted at rest. SQL Server DB not protected with password. Admin passwords are reused and shared. Antivirus is 4.5 years outdated. Windows updates are 3.86 years out of date. User of computer uses a super user account. | ‘Some of the ASOG report’s claims about security problems in Antrim County election equipment are correct or based in fact, but Mr. Ramsland draws several incorrect conclusions.” [5.7] “The report is correct that the authen- tication and access control mechanisms on the EMS have serious weaknesses. Antrim workers almost exclusively used a single Windows user account that had full administrative privileges over the computer (¶I.10).” | “Application and computer system accounts are generic and shared among multiple individuals making it near impossible to determine who performed an action even if proper logging was in place. Hard-coded credentials, failure to use cryptography properly, and other well-known bad practices are utilized throughout the software suggesting that exploitation of the software is very possible. These types of problems are documented to be reoccurring with this EMS going back over 10 years.” | No mention | Out of date security updates and virus definitions. |
| 21 | High Error Rates in Antrim County [J.1] | Of the 15,676 there were a total of 10,667 critical errors/warnings or a 68.05% error rate | Asserts 68% figure is meaningless since scanning a single ballot can result in dozens of lines in a log file. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 22 | High Error Rates in (Central Lake Township) [J.2] | 1,222 ballots reversed out of 1,491 total ballots cast, thus resulting in an 81.96% rejection rate. | This is referring to log entries like those in Figure 10 that say “Ballot has been reversed”. However, these entries have nothing to do with adjudication. They simply mean that the ballot has been returned to the voter | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 23 | High Error Rate reflects an algorithm used [J.3] | Ranked Choice Voting algorithm was enabled. | The EMS and memory card data data show that RCV was not in use, as do the results of the hand recount of the presidential contest. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 24 | Adjudication for write-ins activated [J.4] | Enables poll worker or election official to process the ballot based on voter intent. | Acknowledges adjudication setting active for “write in” ballots. | Digital adjudication software was not installed on the EMS Server image that was reviewed. Examining the Windows Event Logs shows that the DVS Adjudication Services software had been installed on April 10, 2019; but had later been removed on September 3rd, 2019. This explains the DVS Adjudication logs from 2019 referenced from the ASOG report, and also explains why there were not any adjudication logs for 2020. | No mention | No mention |
| 25 | All but 2 Override Options Enabled [J.6] | Enables any operator to change votes that meet the Override Option criteria without any audit trail. 81.96% of total cast ballots triggered these options. | “Override Options” refer to situations where the scanner warns a voter that they may have made a mistake when marking their ballot, such as an overvote or undervote. If the override option is enabled, voters are allowed to acknowledge the warnings and cause the scanner to accept their ballots despite the error conditions. NOTE: If absentee ballot, the “voter” is an election official. | Rank Choice Voting installation was noted in private conversation but there was no indication it was active. | No mention | No mention |
| 26 | 11/6/2020 EMS Log Errors [J.8] | There were configuration errors throughout the set-up, election and tabulation of results. | Human error | EMS Logs deleted upon installation of new election project. | No mention | No mention |
| 27 | 11/21/2020 EMS Log Errors [J.8] | At 13:59:09 a user attempted to zero out election results. | This is absurd and misleading. A programmer would immediately recognize that {0} is merely a placeholder, in this case one that was intended to be replaced with a description of the attempted action [26]. It has nothing to do with “zeroing” election results. | EMS Logs deleted upon installation of new election project. | No mention | No mention |
| 28 | Ranked Choice Voting Module installed | Confirmed | Confirmed | Confirmed in communications but not referenced in report | No mention | No mention |
| 29 | Ranked Choice Voting Module activated | Redacted RCV report shows clear evidence that RCV features were enabled. | Some log entries reference the voting system’s RCV feature, but they do not indicate that it was enabled. No evidence provided in support of assertion that the EMS and memory card data shows that RCV module was not in use. | No evidence it was enabled per communications | No mention | No mention |
Now, let’s look at the claims asserted in the Halderman Report against the content of the other reports.
| ID | Observation | ASOG | Halderman | Cyber Ninjas | Penrose | Cotton |
| 1 | Memory Cards “zeroed” [3.5] | Not mentioned | Identifies Elk Rapids and Milton “re-zeroed” memory cards on 11/3/20 at 8:33pm almost simultaneously. [Figure 3] | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 2 | Data Entry Errors Corrected After Certification [3.8] | Central Lake Twp clerk certification concerns were ignored by Antrim County Clerk. [D.2] | Data Entry Errors were corrected after the results were certified. [3.8] | Manual vote tally entry does not require any commentary or audit log. | No mention | No mention |
| 3 | Claims Regarding Adjudication [5.1] | High error rates indicated that the system was intentionally designed with inherent errors to create systemic fraud and influence election results. | There are several problems with this theory. First, adjudication occurs after ballots are scanned and poll tapes are printed. Second, Mr. Ramsland mischaracterizes the adjudication process. Dominion’s adjudication system produces detailed logs, which are recorded in the EMS to- gether with the ballot scan and the scanner’s original interpretation. Third, and fatally, adjudication functionality was not enabled at all in Antrim County during the November 2020 election. | Digital adjudication software was not installed on the EMS Server image that was reviewed. Examining the Windows Event Logs shows that the DVS Adjudication Services software had been installed on April 10, 2019; but had later been removed on September 3rd, 2019. This explains the DVS Adjudication logs from 2019 referenced from the ASOG report, and also explains why there were not any adjudication logs for 2020. | No mention | No mention |
| 4 | Claims Regarding Errors and Error Rates [5.2] | The tabulation log for the forensic examination of the server for Antrim County from December 6, 2020consists of 15,676 individual events, of which 10,667 or 68.05% of the events were recorded errors. In Central Lake Township there were 1,222 ballots reversed out of 1,491 total ballots cast, resulting in an 81.96% rejection rate | Some errors did occur during scanning, as I explained in Section 4, but they a ected only speci c contests in a small number of precincts, and there is no reason to believe they were intentional. | Without ballot images it is near impossible to match up and see the origin of where errors might be happening. | No mention | No mention |
| 5 | Claims Regarding Log Entries [5.3] | Override options enable any operator (in-person voter or election official processing absentee ballots) to change votes that meet the Override Option criteria without any audit trail. 81.96% of total cast ballots triggered these options. | In actuality, the “Override Options” refer to situations where the scanner warns a voter that they may have made a mistake when marking their ballot, such as an overvote or undervote. If the override option is enabled, voters are allowed to acknowledge the warnings and cause the scanner to accept their ballots despite the error conditions. These settings have nothing to do with “overriding” voters’ selections, and they do not mean the ballots will be sent to adjudication. | Log levels are such on the system that it would be possible to delete files, delete logs, or the similar; and it would be difficult to have the necessary details available to investigate the incident. | No mention | No mention |
| 6 | Claims Regarding Software Updates [5.4] | Help America Vote Act, Safe Harbor provides a 90-day period prior to elections where no changes can be made to election systems”. | Mr. Ramsland repeatedly mischaracterizes the updates to the scanner election de finitions as “software updates” | No mention | No mention | Confirmed |
| 7 | Claims Regarding Central Lake and Mancelona Townships [5.5] | Software updates occurred within 90 day HAVA exclusion period | It points to three down-ballot contests where there were large changes to the results: the Central Lake and Ellsworth school board races and State Proposal 20-1. I explained in Section 4 precisely how these changes resulted from revisions to the ballot design in Central Lake Village. No other contests were affected by those revisions. Referenced HAVA 90 day rule does not exist. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 8 | Claims Regarding Venezuela [5.6] | Michigan resident Gustavo Delfino, a former professor of mathematics in Venezuela and alumni of University of Michigan, offered a compelling affidavit [Exhibit 2] recognizing the inherent vulnerabilities in the SmartMatic electronic voting machines (software which was since incorporated into Dominion Voting Systems) during the 2004 national referendum in Venezuela | Venezuela uses completely di erent voting technology than Michigan, produced by a di erent company and based on touch-screen direct- recording electronic voting machines rather than hand-marked paper ballots. | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 9 | Claims Regarding Software Updates [5.7] | There were multiple Microsoft security updates as well as Microsoft SQL Server updates which should have been deployed, however there is no evidence that these security patches were ever installed. | The report is correct that the EMS is missing important Windows security updates, potentially leaving it vulnerable to various methods of attack | No mention | No mention | No mention |
| 10 | Claims Regarding Security Event Log [5.7] | “all server security logs prior to 11:03 pm on November 4, 2020 are missing. This means that all security logs for the day after the election, on election day, and prior to election day are gone” | The report is correct that the Windows security event log in the EMS image only contains entries extending back to November 4, 2020, the day after the election | Log levels are such on the system that it would be possible to delete files, delete logs, or the similar; and it would be difficult to have the necessary details available to investigate the incident. | No mention | No mention |
| 11 | Claims Regarding Network Connectivity [5.7] | The Dominion ImageCast Precinct (ICP) machines have the ability to be connected to the internet | The report is correct that Dominion scanners have the ability to be connected to external networks. However, Antrim County did not purchase and does not use the Dominion wireless results transmission functionality. | Not mentioned | Dominion provided quote for 17 ICP External Wireless Modems and 5 ImageCast Listener USB Modems. Dominion ICX system was in communications with computers in Taiwan and Germany. | Dominion ICX system communicated with IP addresses in Taiwan and Germany. |
| 12 | Claims Regarding Authentication and Access Control [5.7] | Super User Administrator account is the primary account used to operate the Dominion Election Management System which is a major security risk. | The report is correct that the authen- tication and access control mechanisms on the EMS have serious weaknesses. Antrim workers almost exclusively used a single Windows user account that had full administrative privileges over the computer | Users of the computer have enough access rights and the needed tools installed to directly modify election results in the database. Official results are generated from this database. | No mention | Hampered by incomplete subpoena compliance for data |
Now, let’s look at the claims asserted in the Cyber Ninjas Report against the content of the other reports.
| ID | Observation | ASOG | Halderman | Cyber Ninjas | Penrose | Cotton |
| 1 | Master Encryption Key stored in plain text | No mention | No mention | The master encryption key utilized to encrypt election results is stored in plain text in the database, and its value exists both at the county and with Election Source. If Election Source was hacked, or this value otherwise got into a malicious actor’s hand; it would be possible to create malicious tabulator configurations or alter the results files from tabulators. Either of these could be used to change the results of an election. | No mention | No mention |
| 2 | Log file security model vulnerable | Confirmed | Confirmed | Log levels are such on the system that it would be possible to delete files, delete logs, or the similar; and it would be difficult to have the necessary details available to investigate the incident. | No mention | No mention |
| 3 | Ballot images missing | No mention | Confirmed | Ballot images are missing from the Compact Flash data, making it difficult to audit how the software interpreted any given ballot. It is unclear how write-in candidates could have been properly handled without ballot images available for review. | No mention | No mention |
| 4 | Insufficient audit logs | Confirmed | No mention | Windows Event and EMS Application logs were not configured to prevent tampering. OS configuration does not log access of sensitive files or the deletion of files. EMS logs found in UserLog table are completely deleted any time an election package is loaded within EED. (NOTE: A new package was loaded on 11/5/20). | No mention | No mention |
| 5 | No source code on images despite claims by defendants. | No mention | No mention | There was no source-code encountered on any of the compact flash drives, or on any of the forensic images captured. Only compiled programs were deployed on these systems. | No mention | No mention |
| 6 | Manual Entries Do Not Require a Comment | Confirmed | No mention | The Result Tally and Reporting application can be used to insert manual vote count totals rather than automatically importing those results from a tabulator. Manual overrides can be used to replace existing vote totals rather than pulling them from a tabulator with its associated audit trail. | No mention | No mention |
| 7 | Cryptography & Secret Storage | Bitlocker encryption software used but no physical security | Unable to confirm or refute | Plaintext Cryptographic Keys were used as were hard coded credentials within the application itself that date back to 2010. In addition, passwords were stored as “unsalted” hash and other credentials were evident in plain text configuration files. | No mention | No mention |
| 8 | Multiple Database Connections Hardcoded | Databases were not secured properly | Valid security issues | Storing passwords in plain text is common within the application suite. | No mention | No mention |
| 9 | SQL Server Management Studio installed | Referenced as a tool that was used but no reference as to whether they installed it or it was already installed. | MS SQL Server Management Studio was already installed in system with no need for additional passwords to view and edit election databases. | Installation identified. They noted that it was not a component of EAC Dominion Certification Configuration meaning that the actual voting system used was not in compliance with its certification. | No mention | No mention |
Now, let’s look at the claims asserted in the Penrose Report against the content of the other reports.
| ID | Observation | ASOG | Halderman | Cyber Ninjas | Penrose | Cotton |
| 1 | Dominion submitted quote for modems in Antrim County | No mention | Antrim County did not purchase and does not use the Dominion wireless results transmission functionality. | No mention | Dominion provided quote for 17 ICP External Wireless Modems and 5 ImageCast Listener USB Modems | Incomplete Compliance with Subpoena for Digital Discovery including modems |
| 2 | Evidence of Internet Communications | Hampered by log deletions | Based on the EMS event log, it does not appear that the EMS has ever been connected to a network. | No mention | Dominion ICX system was in communications with computers in Taiwan and Germany. | Confirmed |
| 3 | Evidence of Cell Network Communication Issues During Primary | No mention | Based on the EMS event log, it does not appear that the EMS has ever been connected to a network. | No mention | Email from Dominion to Antrim County proves external network connectivity and also reveals that Dominion turned off image saving without authorization. | No mention |
| 4 | Wireless Communications Chip installed on Motherboard | Referenced as a tool that was used but no reference as to whether they installed it or it was already installed. | No mention | No mention | Telit 4G modem installed on ES&S voting machine in county adjacent to Antrim. Evidence that vote totals were communicated via this modem. | Confirmed |
Now, let’s look at the claims asserted in the Cotton Report against the content of the other reports.
| ID | Observation | ASOG | Halderman | Cyber Ninjas | Penrose | Cotton |
| 1 | Evidence of Dominion system internet communications with a number of public and private IP addresses | Hampered by log deletions | Based on the EMS event log, it does not appear that the EMS has ever been connected to a network. | No mention | Confirms evidence | Dominion ICX system communicated with IP addresses in Taiwan and Germany. |
| 2 | Evidence of Wireless Communications Card installed on ES&S system motherboard | No mention | Based on the EMS event log, it does not appear that the EMS has ever been connected to a network. | No mention | Confirms evidence | DS400 had a Verizon cellular wireless communications card that was active on powerup which gives ability to connect to public internet. |
| 3 | Out of Date Security Updates and Virus Definitions | Confirmed | Confirmed | No mention | No mention | Last operating system and antivirus definition file updates occurred in 2016. |
| 4 | Incomplete Compliance with Subpoena for Digital Discovery | No mention | No mention | No mention | No mention | Not all voting equipment was provided including the following important items: (a) ImageCast Listener Express Server (b) ImageCast Express Firewall (c) EMS Express Managed Switch (d) ICP Wireless Modems (17) (e) ImageCast Communications Manager Server (f) ImageCast Listener RAS System (g) ImageCast USB Modems (5) |
Other Pertinent Observations
The following information is related to the technical operations regarding election systems. It provides additional insights that should be factored in when evaluating the various Antrim County technical reports.
Dr. Nia
According to NT Times, in April 2018, J. Alex Halderman from University of Michigan computer scientist demonstrated in a video how simple it is to rig a DVS machine. In the video, Dr. Halderman demonstrates how easy it is to rig the DVS machine. The name of the video is “I Hacked an Election. So Can the Russians.” A caption next to the title read “It’s time America’s leaders got serious about voting security.” (Source: https://www.c-span.org/video/?463480-4/washington-journal-j-alex-halderman- discusses-election-security)
Despite DVS’s constant denial about the flaws of its systems, the company’s ImageCast Precinct optical scanner system was totally hacked in August 2019. This occurred during the largest and most notable hacker convention, called DEFCON Voting Machine Hacking Village in Nevada. The DVS ImageCast Precinct is an integrated hybrid voting equipment by combining an optical paper ballot and ballot marking device to allow accessibility for the visually impaired. The system runs the Busybox Linux 1.7.4 operating system, which has known medium to high level exploitable vulnerabilities to allow remote attackers to compromise the VDS. (J. Moss, H. Hurtsi, M. Blaze et al., Voting Village Report, DEFCON Village Report in association with and Georgetown University Law Studies; Online Source: https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2027/voting-village-report-defcon27.pdf). The report indicated that “many of the specific vulnerabilities reported over a decade earlier (in the California and Ohio studies, for example) are still present in these systems today (A. Padilla, Consolidated report by California Secretary of State, Top-to-Bottom Review summary and detailed report, Page 4 (Online Source: https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review)
In 2019, a computer laptop and several USB memory cards containing the cryptographic key to access DVS systems were stolen in Philadelphia. The company disputes the risks posed by lost USB memory cards containing the cryptographic key. However, according to the election security expert Eddie Perez of the nonpartisan OSET Institute states “it is very common that a USB memory card has a wealth of information that is related not only to the configuration of the election and its ballot — and the behavior of the voting device — but also internal system data used to validate the election.” I have previously analyzed the contents of the DVS and other voting system cryptographic keys. I believe that USB memory cards were used to facilitate administrative access to the backdoor to disrupt polling operations and impact ballot counting across MI, GA, PA, AZ and WI.
In 2018, NY Times conducted an investigation and concluded that DVS machines can be easily hacked. Subsequently, security experts conducted comprehensive security testing on DVS in August 2019 and discovered innumerable exploitable vulnerabilities that do not require extensive technical skill to breach. The DEFCON report identified major exploitable security flaws in DVS that were shared with the vendor. However, there is ample indication that these problems were not resolved. Moreover, DVS maintains the position that its voting machines are fully secure. They continue to avoid transparency or make their software codes to be analyzed by independent security investigators. In turn, December 2019, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Ron Wyden and Amy Klobuchar, along with Democratic Representative Mark Pocan raised major concerns regarding security vulnerabilities in DVS machines.
Sworn Affidavit of Dr. Nia
Josh Merritt
The following affidavits have been attributed by some to Josh Merritt:
305th Military Intelligence Battalion Analyst- Affidavit 1
305th Military Intelligence Battalion Analyst- Affidavit 2
This attribution appears to be confirmed by the following interview that affirms many of the assertions made in the affidavit.
The testimony provided confirms the internet-based vulnerabilities cited in multiple reports by technical experts. Furthermore, assertions by Halderman regarding Smartmatic and Venezuela pertain to the User Interface (UI) while ignoring the glaring security issues cited pertaining to the usage of Smartmatic SSL certifications for Dominion installations. It would seem that the ties between Dominion and Smartmatic are indeed consequential especially in context of 2020 election fraud assertions (Added 5/3/2021).
Professor J. Alex Halderman
By my count, there were 29 core “observations” asserted by ASOG in the report they generated in less than one week after finally getting access to the machines in Antrim County. Four months after their report was submitted, Professor Halderman issued his evaluation of the ASOG report. Out of the 29 core observations made, Halderman’s report only contradicted around 12. Furthermore, what some in the media claimed to be the “definitive” report had several oversights of its own. For example, they assert that override options enabled “voters” to correct errors yet fail to account for the fact that election officials fill the “voters” role they assert for absentee ballots thereby validating key concerns raised in ASOG report. In addition, at least 11 important observations cited by technical experts other than ASOG were not addressed or contradicted by evidence (e.g. modems and internet connectivity).
The 26 March 2021 report on Antrim County, MI is not the first time Professor Halderman has been called to provide expert testimony on electronic voting systems. You may be interested in some of the assertions he has made in these previous assessments so as to compare them with his assessment the voting system vulnerabilities evident in Antrim County.
Lingering Questions
- Is there evidence of adjudication of absentee ballots in the poll books? If manual “spoil and duplicate” method was indeed used as asserted by Antrim County Clerk Sheryl Guy, there should be poll book entries in support of that assertion for all of the ballots rejected by the scanner.
- Is there evidence of wireless chipsets on the motherboards for equipment in Antrim County? There is evidence of a wireless chipset having been installed on election equipment in a neighboring county (See Modem Chips Embedded in Voting System Computer Motherboard )
- Why did Halderman Report not compare the initial results on November 3 to the Final Results rather than his rerun of the tallies? That is the issue at hand. They were contracted to analyze the “Antrim County Incident” not simply Dominion Voting Systems. A rigorous analysis would have included a rerun of the November 3 configuration to validate his assertion of the data manipulation due to mismatched ChoiceManifestation ID’s.
- Why was SQL Management Studio installed? This software suite is an optional tool that is not part of the default installation for SQL Server. The tool enables direct manipulation of election data without using the Dominion Election Management System or any other software-based Election Management System using SQL Server for database environment for that matter. Per Microsoft “SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) is an integrated environment for managing any SQL infrastructure. Use SSMS to access, configure, manage, administer, and develop all components of SQL Server, Azure SQL Database, and Azure Synapse Analytics.”
- How does the assertion by “Michigan election officials” that canvassing would have identified the errors square with the fact that data entry errors were corrected AFTER certification per Halderman Report [Section 3.8]?
Conclusion
Contrary to the media narrative, the Halderman report was neither the “definitive report” nor does it “debunk” the ASOG Antrim report. There is much more in the Halderman report than his disparaging remarks about the ASOG report. In fact, if you read the entire report, it validates the vast majority of the assertions made in the ASOG report or at least does not contradict them. The analysis performed by J. Alex Halderman was indeed systematic, however, it was not thorough as the lingering questions above assert.
As a minimum, the technical reports regarding Antrim County voting system indicate that the system featured significant security vulnerabilities. These local and internet-based vulnerabilities enabled electronic manipulation of election results. The voting system also featured the installation of non-certified software components with the ability to modify election results without any audit trail. The MI SoS, Antrim County Clerk, and media may refer to such evidence as “human error” but there are state and federal statutes which were violated by these “errors”. The deletion of election records is a violation of Title 52 of USC Sections 20701 and 20702. The failure to re-certify the tabulation configuration after making changes to the configuration is a violation of MCL 168.798. The installation of SQL Management Studio means that the software configuration was not compliant with the certified software configuration and therefore grounds for decertification of the election. It remains to be seen whether or not these violations will be addressed by law enforcement officials.
What’s it gonna take? We all know that election was a scam…
Someone needs to dig through Central Lake Township’s paper ballots and find Ballot Number 1107 that played such a starring role in Halderman’s Figure 10: scanned 7 times and all 7 counted for Biden!
Then they can give it an Oscar.
This was solved by the simplest method possible: the ballots were hand counted. And Trump won in Antrim county by a landslide.
If you can answer a question, I would appreciate it immensely. Is part of how The Steal™ worked was setting up ahead of the election a large (huge) number of voter registrations for people who do not exist (fictitious people who never were born)?
Tough to pull off successfully in a small rural county (Antrim County). And tough to do in any case, because you would need to make a hug number of fictitious people, so those ‘people’ would have enough documentation to get a ballot.
And they’d all need mailing addresses to receive a mail-in ballot, and then people would need to fill out the ballots and put a matching signature on the envelope, and then…
MY POINT: the larger you make the fraud to be, the more it becomes exponentially more difficult to execute.
And the larger it is and the more people involved, the harder is is to keep the fraud a ‘hidden’ activity.
Just think for a moment: if you werre in charge, and wanted to enter 100,000 fictitious mail-in ballots, how many election systems and safeguards wou would need to fool, and how many people and addresses and signatures and fake ID info and etc. it would take to be successful. Then try to answer your own question about whether this makes sense.
PS– If making fake people were easy, cyber criminals wouldn’t go to the trouble of stealing real identities: they’d just make them up. But instead, ID stealing is still very prevalent, while using ‘ghost’ people is rarely mentioned.
Why can’t we seem to find any patriots in law enforcement willing to step up and do anything concerning these unlawful issues from the election ?
Why do pilots prefer not to report UFO sightings? When you’ve got a family to feed, don’t know who or where the enemy is and you act against the mob you can find yourself out of a job and with threats – I don’t mind threats to my person but when directed to the ones I love then things change. That’s 1 possible answer to your good question.
Because the election ultimately bypassed the computers and was certified by hand count of the ballots (the county only had +/- 20,000 ballots). The unqualified people who tried to run the computers in Antrim county aren’t there any more.
Just 2 out of the many anomalies / problems detected would be enough to start an investigation and declare those results null till proved right or wrong. Logs, especially access and admin. logs are usually backed up to hourly files, kept in another location and a local backup. It’s either negligence, lack of professionalism or … Occam’s razor “the simplest explanation is usually the best one.” – given all the info. and stakes it is clear which one it is.
Or– just ignore the computers and computer issues completely and simply count the roughly 20,000 ballots in he county (which is how the election was settled and certified). The judge who ruled to NOT overturn the election said it was because the issues were resolved using ‘kindergarten math’ – just manually counting the ballots.
BOTTOM LINE–
Antrim county only had roughly 20,000 votes. Ultimately, all the election equipment could be put in a dump truck and the election could be simply validated by hand counting ballots (which is what Antrim county did to fix their mistakes).
So, though the above information is good fodder for discussion, and can/should be used to fix the systems for future elections, the best resolution for 2020 was the path taken: hand count the ballots and certify the election without the computers.